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Abstract—This paper presents an overview of the ECSEL pro-
ject entitled “Safe Cooperating Cyber-Physical Systems  
using Wireless Communication” (SafeCOP), which runs during 
the period 2016–2019. SafeCOP targets safety-related Cooperat-
ing Cyber-Physical Systems (CO-CPS) characterised by use of 
wireless communication, multiple stakeholders, dynamic system 
definitions (openness), and unpredictable operating environments. 
SafeCOP will provide an approach to the safety assurance of CO-
CPS, enabling thus their certification and development. The pro-
ject will define a runtime manager architecture for runtime detec-
tion of abnormal behaviour, triggering if needed a safe degraded 
mode. SafeCOP will also develop methods and tools, which will be 
used to produce safety assurance evidence needed to certify coop-
erative functions. SafeCOP will extend current wireless technolo-
gies to ensure safe and secure cooperation. SafeCOP will also con-
tribute to new standards and regulations, by providing certifica-
tion authorities and standardization committees with the scientif-
ically validated solutions needed to craft effective standards ex-
tended to also address cooperation and system-of-systems issues. 
The project has 28 partners from 6 European countries, and a 
budget of about 11 million Euros corresponding to about 1,300 
person-months. 
Keywords—cyber-physical systems; systems-of-systems; safety-
assurance; wireless communication 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A safety-critical system is a system whose failure might 
endanger human life or the environment. When a system might 
harm humans or the environment (or is intended to mitigate or 
manage such harm), decision-makers require pre-release safety 
assurance evidence that it manages risk acceptably. In some 
domains, developers prepare an explicit safety case combining 
this evidence with safety arguments, whereas in other domains 
developers must show that their processes and work products 
conform to a relevant standard. For the purpose of this 
document, we call this safety evidence also a “safety case”, and 
the work in SafeCOP applies also for the domains which do not 
explicitly use safety cases. The conceptual basis for certification 
is that the pre-release (design-time) evidence anticipates the 
possible circumstances that can arise from the interaction 
between the system and the environment, to show that these 
interactions do not pose an unacceptable risk. Certification is 
very expensive, and can add a development cost overhead of 25 
to 100%  [1] and in some cases even 10 times more. For example, 
“a commonly accepted rule of thumb is that development of 
safety-certified software costs roughly 10 times as much as non-
certified software with equivalent functionality” [2]. 
If, after performing an initial Hazard Analysis and Risk As-
sessment (HARA), a system is deemed safety-related, it has to 
be certified. Certification is a “conformity of assessment” per-
formed by a third party: a “certification authority”, e.g. an inde-
pendent organization or a national authority. The certification 
process depends on the concrete application domain. However, 
the main ideas are common to all domains. The overall goal is 
to ensure freedom from unacceptable risk.  Safety requirements 
typically consist of a functional part and an integrity level. A 
Safety-Integrity Level (SIL) captures the required level of risk 
reduction, and will dictate the development processes and certi-
fication procedures that have to be followed, depending on the 
standard, e.g., IEC 61508 [3], ISO 26262 [4], or RTCA DO-
178B [5]. 
Once a system is certified, the safety certificate is typically 
valid only for a specific system configuration. This is the case, 
for example, in the avionics area, where the system is certified 
as a whole, and even small changes may result in a requirement 
for complete re-certification. The focus of recent research in 
safety assurance [6] has been to develop “modular” certification 
approaches. The idea is that a “modular safety certificate” can 
be given to an individual subsystem (module), and then these 
certificates will be manually composed into a system certificate. 
Thus, when a module is changed, the re-certification efforts can 
be isolated to the effects of that respective module. Some certi-
fication standards, such as IEC 61508 and ISO 26262, allow 
“modular safety cases” where the safety cases are composed. 
For example, ISO 26262 has the notion of a Safety-Element-out-
of-Context. Recent projects, such as, RECOMP (Reduced Cer-
tification Costs Using Trusted Multicore Platforms, EU Artemis 
JU, 2010–2013) and SafeCer (Safety Certification of Software-
Intensive Systems with Reusable Components, EU Artemis JU, 
2011–2015), have proposed modular certification approaches, 
but these are not yet used in current practice. 
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II. COOPERATIVE OPEN CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
SafeCOP addresses safety-related cooperating cyber-physi-
cal systems, characterised by use of wireless communication, 
multiple stakeholders, dynamic system definitions, and unpre-
dictable operating environments. We refer to such systems-of-
systems as Cooperative Open Cyber-Physical Systems (CO-
CPS). We assume that no single stakeholder has overall respon-
sibility over the CO-CPS, that the cooperation relies on the wire-
less communication to perform a safety-relevant function, and 
that security issues are of concern. Following the taxonomy of 
Wilkies et al. [7], SafeCOP targets systems that are of the fol-
lowing three types: (i) use inter-system communication to reach 
a common goal; (ii) rely on communicated information from 
other systems in order to ensure safe and/or efficient operation; 
(iii) provide services that may compromise safety if the commu-
nication fails.  
Such Cooperative Open Cyber-Physical Systems can suc-
cessfully address several societal challenges. For example, co-
operative vehicles (vehicle-to-vehicle, V2V, and vehicle-to-in-
frastructure, V2I) have been shown to reduce fuel consumption, 
reduce the number of accidents (including injuries and fatali-
ties), result in productivity gains and congestion savings, result-
ing in annual savings of 1,300 to 2,000 billion Euros [8]. The 
US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
has estimated that “V2V safety applications have the potential to 
address approximately 80% of crashes for unimpaired drivers”. 
For Road Weather Stations, which is a use case in the project, 
employing (V2I) and infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V) communi-
cation modes, we can deliver critical up-to-date real-time road-
weather data, which can increase traffic safety. In the maritime 
area, cooperative boats [9] can dramatically increase navigation 
safety, since, according to the IMO (International Maritime 
Organization), 75% of ship accidents worldwide are due to hu-
man error. CO-CPS can also be employed in the healthcare mar-
ket, which is characterized by dramatically increasing costs. For 
example, cooperative robots can be used to reduce the amount 
of physical labour in hospitals. The use cases (UC) addressed in 
the project are summarized in Figure 1. 
The development CO-CPS poses challenges that are not ad-
equately addressed by existing practices nor standards. While 
careful safety-aware design and thorough safety assurance is re-
quired, no single manufacturer has design authority over or re-
sponsibility for the safety of a set of cooperative embedded sys-
tems. Developing a safety critical system typically requires mak-
ing design decisions that trade-off safety concerns, functionality, 
cost, and other considerations. Achieving adequately safe coop-
erative cyber-physical systems requires arriving at, realising, 
and assuring a safe design even though participants in the design 
process are competitors reluctant to share all of their concerns or 
intricacies of designs with each other. Moreover, due to the co-
operative and openness nature, many circumstances which have 
to be covered by the pre-release safety assurance are difficult to 
anticipate at design time in the case of CO-CPS. 
III. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The concrete objectives of SafeCOP are: 
• Objective 1. Develop a safety-assurance framework for 
CO-CPS. The primary objective of SafeCOP is to pro-
pose an approach to the safety assurance of CO-CPS 
which will facilitate their certification and market re-
lease. This will create new applications and market seg-
ments, successfully addressing societal challenges. 
• Objective 2. Develop a reference “Runtime Manager” 
architecture to support the engineering and certification 
of CO-CPS. SafeCOP will define and develop a refer-
ence “Runtime Manager” (which extends the reference 
platforms in the targeted application areas) that detects at 
runtime abnormal behaviour, triggering if needed a safe 
degraded mode. The verification, validation and simula-
tion methods and tools developed as part of Objective 1 
will be used to produce, besides the safety assurance ev-
idence needed to certify cooperative functions, also the 
conditions that need to be observed by the Runtime Man-
ager to ensure safety. 
• Objective 3. Extend the current wireless protocols for 
safe and secure cooperation. SafeCOP will evaluate the 
adequacy of standard wireless technologies for CO-CPS 
 
 
Figure 1. Use cases addressed in the project 
to be used in the target application areas, and will pro-
pose an application-level “safety layer” on top of existing 
protocols to ensure safe and secure cooperation such that 
CO-CPS can be certified.  
• Objective 4. Contribute to new standards and regula-
tions. An important objective of SafeCOP is to contribute 
to new standards and regulations, e.g., provide the certi-
fication authorities and standardization committees with 
the scientifically validated solutions they will need to 
craft effective standards which have been extended to ad-
dress cooperation and system-of-systems issues. 
• Objective 5. Demonstrate the usefulness of SafeCOP 
concepts in target applications. We take five real-world 
applications in several domains and build demonstrator 
systems which show how CO-CPS can have concrete 
utility across a broad range of real commercial applica-
tions. 
IV. CONCEPT AND APPROACH 
Figure 2 presents the SafeCOP safety assurance concept. 
The approach in SafeCOP is to restrict the behaviour of the co-
operative safety function at runtime, such that the design-time 
safety assurance evidence, with additional monitoring at 
runtime, is able to guarantee the safety requirements. Such an 
approach may require changes to the certification standards, 
hence the objective to contribute to new standards and regula-
tions. This is managed thanks to the SafeCOP project partners 
who are safety assessors (DNV GL, Safety Integrity, DTI), as 
well as members of standards committees. Additionally, the pro-
ject is strengthened by  an external advisory board, comprising 
people with vast safety assurance and security-related expertise. 
They will make sure that the innovations developed in SafeCOP 
are grounded in current certification practice and are aligned 
with the current efforts in the technical committees tasked with 
extending the certification standards. 
Figure 2 shows two CPS systems, A and B, developed re-
spectively by two organizations. Note that the systems addressed 
in SafeCOP may consist of several (arbitrary) cooperating 
cyber-physical systems. Each system has a cooperative subsys-
tem co-responsible for the cooperative safety function. The com-
munication is wireless. SafeCOP will extend the current state-
of-the-art wireless protocols by creating an application-level li-
brary and related API that acts as a “safety layer” on top of the 
existing protocols. If this API is used for the communication, we 
guarantee that the communication has “high integrity”, i.e., trust 
that the contents of messages are not corrupted either uninten-
tionally or intentionally. This is needed because otherwise our 
cooperative function A cannot trust and therefore cannot use 
messages from the other system (B) to implement its safety 
function. We will reuse security results from other ARTEMIS 
projects such as DEWI and from the Cooperation Reference 
 
 
Figure 2. The SafeCOP safety assurance concept 
Technology Platform (CRTP), and our focus is on delivering a 
solution which is not susceptible to security threats, such as 
man-in-the-middle attacks. Security concerns are not covered in 
detail in current safety standards, potentially resulting in systems 
that are successfully certified according to relevant safety stand-
ards, but that still are open to security threats that may jeopardize 
safety.  
Each organization prepares their safety assurance evidence 
at design time. In SafeCOP, the safety case prepared by organi-
zation A is done by composing the evidence of the cooperative 
subsystem A with the public evidence from the cooperative sub-
system B (i.e., without exposing the Intellectual Property, IP, of 
organization B). This is similar to modular certification allowed 
by certification standards, e.g., the SEooC (Safety Element out 
of Context) in ISO 26262. The difference is that modular certi-
fication typically does not hide the IP and does not address 
runtime safety assurance. In the proposal, we also refer to this as 
composing safety cases, since the safety-case for the cooperative 
function will be based on the individual safety-cases for subsys-
tems A and B. 
The safety case relies on constraints that restrict the runtime 
behaviour of the safety function, in order to anticipate at design 
time the circumstances that can occur at runtime. These runtime 
constraints are derived from the safety requirements and are en-
forced by a Runtime Manager (RM), which monitors the coop-
erative safety function. The integrity of cooperative subsystem 
A is guaranteed by system A’s architecture and safety mecha-
nisms. The public safety evidence of the subsystem B is refined 
into a set of demands which have to be fulfilled by subsystem B 
in order to ensure its integrity. We call this a “conditional safety 
case”: the safety requirements are guaranteed only if the de-
mands are satisfied. 
If the Runtime Manager detects abnormal behaviour, or if 
the demands are not satisfied, the cooperative safety functional-
ity is disabled. SafeCOP will analyse the requirements of the use 
cases and propose constraints based on the definition of the co-
operative safety functions, such that safety is guaranteed. The 
safety case needs to also consider the risk of requirement viola-
tions, and how to provide failsafe fallback mechanisms. Consid-
ered mechanisms, including safety under such scenarios, will in-
troduce additional constraints on the systems involved. 
The Runtime Manager is implemented as software that needs 
to run on the CO-CPS system to ensure safe cooperation at 
runtime. This RM has to be “separated” from the functionality 
of the device, such that lower-criticality functions do not affect 
the functioning of the high-criticality RM. Some platforms (e.g., 
AUTOSAR1) provide such separation mechanisms, but some 
(such as ROS2) do not, so these separation mechanisms (similar 
in concept to a “virtual machine”, but more lightweight) will 
also have to be developed. The RM has to know what to monitor; 
the “Verification and Validation” methods and tools will pro-
duce safety requirements that need to be monitored at runtime. 
Once the RM detects a safety violation, it will have to fallback 
to a “degraded mode”. The functionality of the “degraded mode” 
will have to be developed in the demonstrators, and it is specific 
to the function of the respective demonstrator. It is challenging 
                                                            
1 http://www.autosar.org 
to develop useful and failsafe fallback functions, since often it is 
not appropriate to just stop (assuming there is a “safe stop” func-
tion). 
The Runtime Manager contains a monitoring module that 
performs data acquisition to collect safety-related data, which is 
then analysed and included in the safety assurance evidence. In 
this context, we say that we have a “living safety case”, which 
is updated with information collected at runtime to increase con-
fidence. In this context we also say that the safety case is incre-
mental, and it may support provisional certificates allowing us-
age in limited scenarios (e.g., initially only in-the-lab use). 
Through evidence collected at runtime, provisional certificates 
can be upgraded to cover more general usage scenarios. The 
qualification of the Runtime Manager and the constraints are 
part of the design-time safety assurance evidence.  
V. WORK PACKAGES 
As the central goal in the project is to provide an approach 
for the safety assurance and engineering of cooperative open 
cyber-physical systems (CO-CPS), we have organized the pro-
ject around a number of use cases that feed requirements and 
problems into the research work-packages (WPs). The proposed 
solutions are then demonstrated and evaluated to ensure the fea-
sibility of the approach. 
The project is organized in seven WPs:  
• WP1. Requirements, 
• WP2. Safety assurance framework for CO-CPS, 
• WP3. Safe and secure wireless cooperation, 
• WP4. Platform and tool support for safety assurance, 
• WP5. Demonstrators and evaluation, 
• WP6. Dissemination and exploitation, 
• WP7. Management. 
The research and innovation work in the project is defined 
by the requirements derived in WP1. These requirements are 
coming from the use cases, which are part of the WP5 on de-
monstrators and evaluation. In WP1 we do the collection, refine-
ment and consolidation of the requirements and research drivers. 
These consolidated requirements and research questions are then 
the basis of the work of WP2, WP3 and WP4, which provide 
solutions that—in turn—are be applied and evaluated in several 
demonstrators in WP5. WP2 is concerned with the development 
of the SafeCOP safety assurance framework targeting CO-CPS, 
which communicate wirelessly. The wireless communication is 
addressed in WP3 where the goal is to extend the current proto-
cols such that they provide the required levels of safety and se-
curity for CO-CPS. The safety assurance framework is sup-
ported by the SafeCOP platform, which consists of reference ar-
chitecture for CO-CPS and methods and tools for producing 
safety assurance evidence. The work in WP2, WP3 and WP4 is 
performed in parallel, with interactions on the issues related to 
the assurance framework, wireless protocol, architecture and 
methods and tools. All WPs are structured such that intermediate 
2 http://www.ros.org 
evaluation of the approach is possible every year. WP7 is re-
sponsible for ensuring and monitoring the collaboration as de-
scribed above; all WP leaders are part of this task. The dissemi-
nation of the major findings of the project will be done in WP6, 
and the management activities in WP7. A description of each 
WP follows. 
WP1 Requirements.  The goal of this work-package is to es-
tablish both the business case of the approach as well as the 
requirements for the solutions as they apply to different do-
mains. The business cases establish goals that have to be 
achieved, and that can be assessed in the evaluation work-pack-
age (WP5). The requirements provide the specific constraints 
and problems that have to be solved in work packages WP2, 
WP3, WP4. The focus of WP1 is on safety and security related 
requirements for the implementation of cooperative safety 
functions required by the use cases. 
WP2 Safety assurance framework for CO-CPS. The main 
objective of this work package is to develop a practical safety 
assurance framework for CO-CPS. After an evaluation of the 
state of the art on safety assurance, the WP proposes an assur-
ance framework that can address the challenges of CO-CPS by 
combining pre-release safety assurance with runtime monitor-
ing. The basis for this framework is a composable safety case, 
which contains “demands” placed on cooperative subsystems 
in order to provide safety “guarantees” for the cooperative 
safety function. In this WP we also evaluate and extend a safety 
analysis method called STAMP, which is suitable for systems 
with a lot of interactions. This work package also produces a 
set of scientifically proven recommendations for the certifica-
tion of CO-CPS. 
WP3 Safe and secure wireless cooperation. In SafeCOP we 
address cooperative open systems that communicate using 
wireless technologies. We are interested to elevate the state-of-
practice to develop technologies that are both safe and secure, 
to be used in the context of CO-CPS. Hence, we start by evalu-
ating standard wireless technologies that can potentially be used 
for cooperative safety functions, and we extend these wireless 
technologies to ensure and facilitate assurance of safety and se-
curity in cooperative embedded systems. Once a safe and secure 
communication solution is available, in this work package we 
are also interested to design distributed cooperation algorithms 
with safety-critical requirements. 
WP4 Platform and tool support for safety assurance. The 
goal of this work package is to provide a platform and tool sup-
port for safety assurance. The WP defines a reference platform 
(hardware, OS and middleware), with the aim to guarantee the 
integrity of the cooperative function. We will extend the major 
platforms from each application area, e.g., AUTOSAR for au-
tomotive and ROS (which lacks safety mechanisms) for mobile 
robots. The novel component in the platform is a Runtime Man-
ager, which enforces the cooperative function safety require-
ments providing a failsafe state in case of failure. This work 
package also extends the ARTEMIS Reference Tools Platform, 
with a focus on extending tool flows to support in efficiently 
producing safety evidence for certification. 
WP5 Demonstrators and Evaluation. The consortium devel-
ops a number of demonstrators to show the applicability of the 
approach in different industrial areas. The demonstrators are 
built using the wireless technologies, platforms, methods and 
tools in WP3 and WP4, by applying the safety assurance pro-
cess developed in WP2. This work-package also evaluates the 
results of the demonstrators. It provides various requirements 
input to WP1, and provide feedback that can be used to guide 
further research and development work in work packages WP2, 
WP3, and WP4. 
WP6 Dissemination and exploitation. All partners advertise 
SafeCOP to their networks; academic, industrial, business or 
general public. This work-package includes setting up the pro-
ject web site, producing newsletters, organization of work-
shops, demo booths, etc. An important component is also to li-
aison with standardization organizations to provide information 
about the results of the project. The objective of the exploitation 
phase is to identify and implement the actions necessary to 
maximize the market value, the business potential and the social 
benefits for the European Union of the project outcomes. The 
phase will be carried out using the consortium’s networks and 
other channels to explore vertical applications, use cases and 
disseminate commercially the solutions developed within the 
project. The exploitation will also address the standardization 
activities: the definition of new standards for safety require-
ments and the specification of methodologies for testing and 
compliance to the SafeCOP concept, will represent an im-
portant achievement/highlight of the project. 
WP7 Management. This work package contains all tasks re-
lated to the management of the project, i.e. monitoring and re-
porting. Central to the success of the project will be the estab-
lishment of a good quality plan, risk management plan and 
communication plans to ensure good information flow between 
the partners. Moreover, this work package also includes 
knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) management 
in the project. 
VI. CONSORTIUM 
The consortium is industry-led, consisting of 7 Large Enter-
prises, 10 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), working with 
6 universities and 5 Research Transfer Organisations. The part-
ners are positioned across the full value chain, from technology 
providers, to system integrators, OEMs and end-users. The pres-
ence of 3 safety assessors and 6 members of standardization 
bodies facilitates the exploitation of safety assurance results. As 
already mentioned previously, beside the stakeholders repre-
sented by ECSEL JU monitoring the project, the project estab-
lished an advisory board.   
Special emphasis is taken on a balance between technology 
users and providers on the one side, and large companies, SMEs 
and researchers on the other. This balance will facilitate the tech-
nology transfer from theory into industrial practice. Particular 
emphasis has been put on the integration of SMEs. This can be 
seen on the quality and number of SMEs involved in the project. 
The enterprises (SMEs and LEs) include Original Equipment 
Manufacturers, system integrators, and end-users.  
The project partners are from six European countries, with 
four representatives from the Nordic countries (Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden) and two from Southern Europe (Italy 
and Portugal). An overview of the number of partners per coun-
try can be found in Figure 3 
The project coordinator is Alten Sverige, a Sweden-based 
LE with a presence in 20 countries. The LE’s (Alten Sverige, 
DNVGL, GMVIS Skysoft, Intecs, Odense University Hospital, 
TEKEVER Autonomous Systems and Thales Italy) and SMEs 
(ALTE Visetec, Aitek, Impara, Intelligence Behind Things So-
lutions, Maritime Robotics, SITO, Qamcom Research & Tech-
nology, Ro Technology, Safety Integrity and Technicon) in the 
project cover several market domains with representatives from 
the automotive, maritime and healthcare sectors. Their presence 
ensures that the five use cases are properly grounded, that solu-
tions are business-oriented, and that the final exploitation of the 
results reaches the right groups across multiple domains.  
Having experience with nationally co-funded projects where 
a whole country has had to drop out, we have organised our five 
demonstrators in national units bound together by an interna-
tional research “cap” with sufficient redundancy in expertise to 
cover the withdrawal of a single country if need be. Each of the 
national units are partners who have worked successfully to-
gether before, though not all on the same projects, and all of the 
university researchers involved have worked together previ-
ously in various subgroup combinations. All of the university 
partners and most of the industrial partners have previous expe-
rience with both national and international research projects, alt-
hough three of the partner departments have not been involved 
in European projects before.  
A. Setting up the consortium 
The ARTEMIS and ECSEL funding instruments have pro-
moted the assembly of very large and complex projects, often 
involving more than 100 person years, 8-100 partners and a 
(public) budget of between 0.4-42 million Euros. The average 
project has 25 partners and 9 million Euros total budget [10]. 
The strategy is to “think big” to gain “impact” and even if it is 
not primarily the size of the consortium that is meant, it is still 
an underlying message, that the larger it is, the more impact it 
will have. “The ARTEMIS mantra 'think big' does not mean that 
all projects have to be huge ones like the ARTEMIS CESAR 
project (Cost-efficient methods and processes for safety relevant 
embedded systems), which has about 58 partners and about €68 
million of investment, it means thinking about the impact that 
the project will have” [11]. The dimension of the projects poses 
several challenges for its management. Hence it is not likely that 
all the staff from two partners ever meet in the project. The pol-
icy of promoting large and complex projects is also reflected in 
the support for proposal that is available in the ARTEMIS con-
sortium-building events. At the breakout session all interested 
potential partners are welcome. There is no mechanism to allow 
the consortium leader to sort out undesired partners. The worst 
scenario is to walk off with 30-40 interested organisations, all of 
them expecting to be part of the proposal; limiting the consor-
tium is a difficult task.  
The funding of ARTEMIS/ECSEL is a blend of European 
contribution and contributions from each national innovation 
agency [12]. Each national agency has its own criteria and rules 
for payment. Most countries ask for an industrial project leader, 
and a specific budget ratio between industry and academia. That 
means that one prospective academic partner often has to find 
one or two other partners from the private sector to be nationally 
eligible. This means that the consortium will grow at least one 
extra round, without any real chance for the consortium leader 
to control the development.  
Specific challenges are: the risk that large segments of part-
ners or sub-clusters fall away, including valued partners, the risk 
that some sub-clusters cannot create eligible national consortia, 
and when some countries choose not to fund a specific project, 
or otherwise run short on budget—or, frankly, stop supporting 
the funding scheme.  
A structured semi-open methodology. We have had experi-
ence with such a “snowball strategy” several times before. To 
take the lead and propose a topic and gather a consortium is not 
an easy task in a very open environment.  As an alternative to 
the “snowball strategy”, we performed a more structured process 
in the SafeCOP proposal. That fosters narrower, smaller and (we 
believe) better consortia. The objectives for this are to gather a 
large group of interested potential partners, but through the pro-
cess select the most desired ones.  
We first proposed our SafeCOP project at a consortium-
building event, early in February 2014. In this case we presented 
the project in a five-minute pitch talk, together with 50 other 
presenters in a plenum session. We also presented a poster, and 
 
Figure 3. The SafeCOP consortium 
the project was also posted on the web a couple of weeks ahead. 
The result was a list of 37 interested individuals, representing 31 
different organisations, where 4 were large companies or indus-
tries, 6 SMEs, 12 institutes and 9 universities, from 14 countries. 
The “usual” process would be to use the breakout sessions to 
form an initial outline of the proposal, and start assembling the 
consortium.  
But for us, the next step was to contact the 37 person large 
group after two weeks. The message was that we planned to 
form a consortium out of the group of interested partners. They 
were all given the task to describe (1) their own organisation, (2) 
what their contribution would be and (3) whether they would be 
willing to lead any task. They were given a three-week deadline. 
The result was a detailed list of potential partners, but the list 
had been shortened to 10 potential partners, of whom 1 was from 
industry, 2 from SMEs, 3 from institutes and 4 from universities, 
from 10 countries. We believe that the action sorted out the bet-
ter half of the list—those who were actually responsive to joint 
actions.  
At the end of the day eligible country consortia are needed 
in this kind of call, and therefore the next step was to ask the 10 
interested potential partners to provide national rules for the call 
(if known), and also to propose additional potential partners 
from their own country if needed, with respect both to national 
rules and the direction of the proposal. The potential partners 
had one week to suggest partners and another week to get the 
same kind of information from these new, suggested partners. 
At this stage at least one country left, but also one new entered. 
The result was a detailed list of potential partners, but the list 
had been extended to 26 potential partners, of whom 5 were 
from industry, 8 from SMEs, 7 from institutes and 6 from uni-
versities, from 10 countries.  
Thereafter we selected three core partners, from three differ-
ent countries (Denmark, Italy and Portugal); however, the Italian 
company could not commit itself at this stage. The core team 
worked out a “write-up” and selected partners and partner coun-
tries, mostly from the set of already interested partners, but also 
some totally new ones, that fitted into the project. Now the first 
revision of the consortium was Sweden, Denmark and Portugal, 
plus Norway, the Netherlands and Germany. In addition, Austria 
was asked to join. A message was issued for all the interested 
organisations that they were currently not included, but that they 
might be taken into account at a later stage. At this stage Italy 
re-entered into the consortium, while Austria, the Netherlands 
and Germany fell away.  
We have established this way of working to find better ways 
to establish new European research consortia. First, we identify 
la tête de la course, as a core team, and then we pick the break-
away specialist out of the bunch of the platoon—using a sports 
idiom. In this “marathon methodology” we try to select the best 
of those who want the most, to form a winning team.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented the SafeCOP ECSEL project. We 
have covered the societal challenges addressed, the project ob-
jectives, the overall approach and the consortium formation pro-
cess. As mentioned, SafeCOP targets safety-related Cooperating 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CO-CPS), where no single stake-
holder has the overall responsibility over the resulted system-of-
systems; safe cooperation relies on the wireless communication; 
and security is an important concern. Although such CO-CPS 
can successfully address several societal challenges, and can 
lead to new applications and new markets, their certification and 
development is not adequately addressed by existing practices. 
Note that many of the the research and innovations of SafeCOP 
also apply to CO-CPS that are not safety-related.  
SafeCOP brings clear benefits in terms of cross-domain cer-
tification practice and implementations of cooperating systems 
in all addressed areas: healthcare, maritime, vehicle-to-vehicle 
and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I). The advantages include 
lower certification costs, increased trustworthiness of wireless 
communication, better management of increasing complexity, 
reduced effort for verification and validation, lower total system 
costs, shorter time to market and increased market share. The 
results are demonstrated in five demonstrators: cooperative 
moving of empty hospital beds, cooperative bathymetry with 
boat platoons, vehicle control loss warning, vehicle and roadside 
units’ interaction and V2I cooperation for traffic management.  
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